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Abstract
The endeavor to apply the theory of judgment aggregation (TJA)
to scientific practice has two main motivating factors. First, this ap-
plication proceeds from the hope that this new theory could provide
a new perspective on well-known problems of the philosophy of sci-
ence. Secondly, it stems from the desire to extend this theory to new
domains, and even to seemingly intractable cases. A peculiar feature
of scientific social practices is that they connect people that belong to
diverse generations. This paper argues that standard theories of judg-
ment aggregation cannot apply to scientific practice, since science is
a temporally extended process that involves both different individuals
and different hypotheses during that process. Thus, for example, we
seem to have no idea how to determine the judgments of dead scientists
about theoretical alternatives that were proposed after their death. It
then proposes an algorithm for judgment aggregation to try to address
some of these challenges.
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1 the ideal of an intergenerational aggregation pro-
cedure
1.1 The challenge of extending TJA to scientific practice
Broadly understood, a theory of aggregation seeks to discover how a group
could produce judgments or decisions that outperform the cognitive abilities
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2of the individuals composing this group. The normative reflection on aggre-
gation procedures could stem from an empirical observation as well as from
a thought experiment: depending on the aggregation or voting rules that are
accepted, the same set of individual judgments or preferences can generate
various collective preferences or decisions. Therefore, an aggregation theory
is a normative theory that ought to compare the ability of several possible
procedures to generate results that can meet the goals that motivate the
implementation of this procedure.
A scientific practice can be roughly characterized as a collective endeavor
aiming at finding true explanatory principles in a given area. I will refer to
the judgments on these explanatory principles as “theoretical judgments”.
TJA seems like a perfect framework within which to investigate this practice,
since one can hope to aggregate various judgments on explanatory principles
that are discussed within a group.
At first glance, the TJA seems to easily model and evaluate the func-
tioning of scientific communities. It has recently shown that sociological
accounts of these communities, for instance the description by Knorr-Cetina
(1999) of the HEP experiments, fit List’s following theorem:
For any group size n (divisible by k), there exists an indi-
vidual (positive and negative) reliability level r∗ > r such that
the following holds: if, by specializing on some proposition p,
individuals achieve a reliability above r∗ on p, then the majority
judgment on p in a subgroup of nk specialists (each with reliabil-
ity r∗ on p) is more reliable than the majority judgment on p in
the original group of non-specialists (each with reliability r on
p). (List, 2005)
However, science is not only a sociological phenomenon, but also a his-
torical phenomenon: it is not only a process where living people interact,
but also an intergenerational process of cooperation. There are three kinds
of interactions within this practice: interactions among the living, interac-
tions between the living and the deceased, and interactions between living
and virtual people, that is the future generations. As long as this second
aspect of scientific social practice, that is, the intergenerational component,
is not accounted for, the application of TJA to the scientific communities
only constitutes a partial extension of this theory to the scientific practice.
These intergenerational interactions can be observed in various social
and historical phenomena:
31. Transmission: this phenomenon brings about knowledge cumula-
tively, across several dimensions: knowledge about singular facts, knowl-
edge on phenomenal regularities within phenomena, technical knowl-
edge (both material and formal).
2. Collaboration: Some questions cannot be raised without other ques-
tions having been previously raised and, often, answered. I will call
these questions that are raised by a given generation “intragenerational
questions”.
3. Epistemic dependence: Some questions cannot be raised as long as
an adequate vocabulary has not been established.
4. Disagreement: the formulation of new hypotheses that break away
from past hypotheses as an answer to what I will refer to as “trans-
generational questions”. For instance, on the same question, “Does
void exist?”, Aristotle opposes Democritus, Galileo opposes Aristotle,
Torricelli opposes Galileo, and so on.
Since this last aspect of the intergenerational relationship involves judg-
ments, there are rational hopes that it could be modeled within the TJA
framework. The goal of this paper is to attempt to do so and to answer the
following question: can there exist an aggregation procedure of intergener-
ational judgments that generates more reliable theoretical judgments than
those which would be produced by each generation working in isolation?
1.2 The challenge of the intergenerational feature of scien-
tific practice
Intergenerational disagreement calls into question several aspects of the stan-
dard view about science and thereby raises at least four important problems
of the philosophy of science. The historical continuity/discontinuity prob-
lem deals with the threat of incommensurability that follows from the ex-
istence of theoretical breaks between successive generations. The problem
of unconceived alternatives, recently formulated by Stanford (2006), is a
new version of the underdetermination thesis: reflecting on the fact that
the history of science offers several cases where new theoretical hypotheses
have been formulated that had not been conceived before, Stanford main-
tains that nothing can guarantee that our best present theories will not be
replaced sooner or later by empirically equivalent but logically incompati-
ble theories. This claim is used to argue that we should not be optimistic
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ries. The existential problem stems from what Kierkegaard (2009) calls “the
anticipation of the retrospection”: the efforts of researchers seems absurd,
meaningless, or aimless, if the result of their findings can be totally reversed
by the subsequent, unpredictable and unconceivable interventions of future
generations. The scientific agency problem consists in concluding, in light
of contradicting scientific opinions over time, that that the set of scientists
could be regarded as a collective subject.
It is rational to hope that TJA could offer a framework to solve these
problems by helping us to decide between a revisionist and a traditional
conception of science. The revisionist perspective denies to science proper-
ties that are traditionally associated with it: historical continuity, epistemic
optimism, existential satisfaction, the unity of the enterprise. As revisionists
focuses on the empirical fact of intergenerational disagreement, the norma-
tive reflection associated with TJA could help to establish that their claims
are not well-grounded: TJA could constructively prove that the intergen-
erational character of the scientific practice does not necessarily lead to
renouncing the traditional view of science.
Indeed, if a procedure of aggregation of intergenerational judgments
(PAIJ) could be constructed, the following alternative theses could be drawn.
Against incommensurability, the successive opinions could be regarded as
the elements of an homogeneous collective judgment. Against epistemic pes-
simism, a more optimistic conception of science could be sustained where
the ability of the present theory to access truth is not cancelled by the pos-
sibility of unconceived alternatives. Against existential despair, a scientist
could legitimately believe that his efforts will contribute to the collective
judgment. Against agency nominalism, we could see scientists as struggling
together towards the same goal.
2 The obstacle of the interviewer’s temporal mo-
bility
An aggregation procedure is a group of rules that permits us to derive a
collective judgment from the empirical basis of the procedure. It has its
starting point in the set of judgments that a group of individuals holds on
one or several propositions. I will call “empirical basis of the procedure”
the set of information concerning these judgments. The empirical basis of
the procedure must be collected from individual judgments found in a social
reality and then be represented. I will call “interviewer” the ideal individual
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where these individuals (in our case, scientists) are living contemporaries,
so that the procedure can be started after a phase of judgment collection:
as these two steps are clearly separated, the temporal neutrality of the ag-
gregation procedure is guaranteed: the decision to launch the procedure at
one moment rather than at another does not affect its result.
The main obstacle to a PAIJ is the fact that depending on the historical
location of the interviewer, the aspect of the empirical base varies. In what
follows, I am going first to distinguish the different species of these varia-
tions and the specific kind of obstacle they present to the work of the ideal
interviewer. The consequence of this variability of the empirical basis is the
possibility that the application of the same set of rules to the same reality
produces opposite results. These results are paradoxes, understood as con-
trary propositions that are nonetheless equally justified. The confrontation
of these distortions with the temporal neutrality ideal will be used to de-
fine the limits and the rules that a PAIJ should accept. This will give me
a ground on which to first elaborate a technique of representation of the
empirical basis of the procedure.
2.1 Problems stemming from the variation of the empirical
basis
The first two problems come from the fact that past and present scien-
tists do not have an opinion about hypotheses of which they cannot con-
ceive, whereas present and future generations can formulate judgments on
hypotheses belonging to the past. I will refer to this phenomenon as the
intergenerational epistemic asymmetry (IEA).
• The spiritism problem: Given IEA, how can we obtain from the
deceased to take a stand on theoretical possibilities that they ignored?
• The oracle problem: given IEA, it is not only impossible for us to
know what will be the hypotheses that will be accepted tomorrow,
but also to foresee what will be the stance of future generations on
propositions that we accept today.
• The generational individuation problem: the concept of gen-
erations, understood as referring to groups, is not a natural species:
human individuals, as living creatures, are continuously born. It is
therefore difficult to determine which individuals to include in a gen-
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only one generation or millions of them.
• The problem of the fixation of origin: The “interviewer” can ei-
ther take into account every judgments recorded since the formulation
of a question, or only those judgments that are subsequent to a given
date. It he wanted to, the interviewer could justify such a disqualifi-
cation on the ground that before a certain historical moment, people
did not have the technical or social means to deal rationally with a
question.
• The kairos problem: the undertaking of starting an aggregation
procedure is the pragmatical equivalent to a declaration designating
the present moment as the one starting from which opinions do not
count anymore for the collective opinion. The aggregation action is
necessarily egocentric: the content it offers is not objective, but is
structured according to the temporal position of the interviewer. Fu-
ture generations are disqualified.
• Since a period is delimited by two frontiers, the fixation of origine
and the kairos problems form together what could be called the peri-
odization problem.
2.2 Paradoxes that result from these problems
I now intend to prove that the periodization problem enables the interviewer
to reverse any result of any procedure. The representation of the empiri-
cal basis of the procedure appears to be subjective in two ways: it not
only necessarily rests on an arbitrary choice, but it also necessarily involves
self-reference. I refer to this result as an impossibility theorem: the rep-
resentation of the empirical basis cannot be objective. It follows from this
impossibility theorem that the ideal interviewer is endowed with ultimate
authority on the matter of what the collective judgment should be: what-
ever the procedure used is, he is the one whose decision determines what
the collective judgment should be.
2.2.1 a) The majority procedure
This procedure regards the judgment that the most people take on a propo-
sition as the group’s judgment. There exist several possible historical situa-
tions relevant to that procedure. Either there are only two possible answers
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case, generations that share the same judgment can follow one another or
can alternate with generations that do not share their judgment. Here, I am
going to focus on a simple situation, since the same pattern of reasoning can
easily be applied to complex situations. Let us therefore suppose a real situ-
ation where there are two possible continuous opinions: either the majority
opinion includes the present one, or it excludes it. In the first case, it is
possible to turn the majority opinion into a minority opinion by deciding to
dissociate the moment of aggregation and the posterior limit of the period.
In the second case, to turn the majority opinion into the minority, it is only
necessary to move the anterior limit of the period.
2.2.2 b) The unanimity procedure
This procedure generates a collective judgment from a set of judgments
only if this judgment is unanimous within a given group. Two relevant
initial situations are possible: unanimity or non-unanimity. If there is no
unanimity, it is always possible to generate unanimity by narrowing the
empirical basis of the procedure, whereas if there is unanimity, it is always
possible to destroy it by broadening the empirical basis, in the direction
either of the past or the future.
2.2.3 The dictatorial procedure
This procedure derives the collective judgment from the judgment of one
member of the group. The philosophy of science has opposed two kinds of
dictatorial procedure: critical rationalism and traditionalism. In the first
case, the dictatorship is assumed by the present generation, whereas in the
second case, it is ascribed to a definite past generation.
2.3 Restriction on the constitution of the empirical basis
My goal here is to avoid paradoxes and to escape the impossibility theorem
by questioning the assumptions of the theorem and accepting a set of re-
strictions that should be followed by the interviewer. In the next section, I
will offer a procedure that respects these restrictions. For now, I would like
to show how to formalize the empirical basis of the procedure.
Let us start with the list of the three restrictions:
1. No overlapping generations. (This restriction enables the interviewer
to count generations.)
82. No oracle.
3. No spiritism.
As a consequence, an aggregation procedure is bound to be egocentric.
These restrictions set the basis for a set of interview techniques designed
to take them into account. The subjective effects of this egocentric point
of view can be circumscribed by a “metaprocedure comparison”: the in-
tergenerationnal situation render possible a succession of procedures and,
therefore, the comparison of their results. Even though each one is egocen-
tric, the outcome of the comparison can be objective.
The “non overlapping” restriction enables the interviewer to use a chart
which represents the judgments of each generation on a set of possible an-
swers to a question. I will note as Gq the generation that has formulated a
transgenerational question and as Gp the present generation. I will note as
Gu the ultimate generation, that is the generation that will have the correct
answer and know all possible hypotheses. From the “no oracle” and “no
spiritism” conditions follow the need of specific notation: I will use Y for
a positive judgment, N for a negative judgment, ∅ for the ignorance of a
proposition,and ? for the cases when the interviewer does not know what
a generation answers. With this notational system, the interviewer could
represent the empirical basis of a procedure with such a chart as the one
that follows:
Gq G(p+1) Gp G... Gp G(p+1) ... Gu
H1 ∅ ∅ ? ... ? N ? ?
H2 Y N Y ... Y Y ? ?
H3 ∅ Y N ... N N ? ?
Table 1: Empirical basis chart
3 Description of an intergenerational judgment ag-
gregation procedure
3.1 Definition of the goals of the procedure
This procedure can have two objectives: knowledge and progressiveness.
93.1.1 a) Definition of knowledge
List & Puppe (2009) suggests that to evaluate the ability of a procedure to
meet the knowledge challenge, the concept of knowledge offered by Nozick
could be useful. This definition enables List to apply the same concept of
knowledge to both individuals and groups; to make possible quantitative
evaluations of the relationship between an agent and knowledge; and finally
to build the concepts of positive and negative competence. According to
this definition, one can say that an individual S or a group G knows that p
if and only if the four following conditions are met:
1. S orG believes or assert that p.
2. p is true
3. If p had not been true, S or G would not have believed or asserted
that p.
4. There are no cases where p could have been true without S or G
believing or asserting it.
Drawing on this definition, List uses conditional probabilities to build
the concepts of positive and negative competence. The positive competence
of an individual S is the probability that S asserts p, given that p is true.
The negative competence of S is the probability that S rejects p, given that
p is false. The advantage of these notions is that they enable us to quantify
the trustworthiness of groups or individuals in order to decide whether the
aggregation procedure has been useful or to compare the efficiency of two
procedures.
3.1.2 b) Definition of progressiveness
Progressiveness cannot be the goal of only one procedure but of several.
Indeed, this goal cannot be pursued unless we compare the results of several
successive procedures. The succession of several procedures is progressive
if the fact of successively implementing these procedures at moments t1
and t2 guarantees the increase of our knowledge. Formulated in terms of
competence: there is a progression if, between t1 and t2, the positive and
negative competence have increased. Thus:
• There has been a progression between t1 and t2 if Pt1(Bp ∧ p) <
Pt2(Bp ∧ p).
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• There has been a progression between tt1 and t2 if Pt1(Bp ∧ p) >
Pt2(Bp ∧ p).
3.2 Elucidation of the presuppositions of the procedure
The general conditions of a procedure must be compared to the description
of the scientific practice.
3.2.1 a) Independence of generations
It is necessary to clearly see the difference between information dependence
and judgment dependence. The present generation depends on past gen-
erations in order to know what hypotheses have been conceived and what
judgments have been made of them. However, this does not imply that the
present judgment has to be the same as the past one. Indeed, past non over-
lapping generations have no power over the present generation. Moreover,
the experimental method, broadly understood, supposes that each individ-
ual, and moreover each generation, has the right, if not the obligation, to
criticize hypotheses of the past by confronting them with his own experi-
ments.
3.2.2 b) The dissymmetry of positive and negative competences
I have defined the scientific practice as the research, in a given area, of
the true explicative principles, that is, propositions from which a set of
phenomena can be deduced. As it is possible to deduce true consequences
from false propositions, several propositions exist which could fulfill the
explanative demand concerning the phenomena. As a consequence of this
abductive nature of scientific research, several logically incompatible but
empirically equivalent theories exist throughout history. And the more there
are possible hypotheses, and the more choosing one of these hypotheses is
risky.
This problem is deepened by the fact that we cannot know how many
hypotheses are possible, because of the conjecture concerning unconceived
alternatives. Therefore, it seems that, if hypothesis h is true, the chance that
a generation believes h is extremely low: partly because of their own creativ-
ity, the positive reliability of scientists is much lower that 50%. On the other
hand, the experimental method seems to guarantee a high level of negative
competence to scientists, since their ability to recognize that a hypothesis
is false does not vary with the number of possible hypotheses. Since the
historical and empirical knowledge of new generations is steadily increased
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by the empirical results produced by the previous generation, the negative
competence of a generation is always higher than the negative competence
of any previous generation.
3.3 Description of the procedure
Within the theoretical framework that I have offered it should be obvious
that neither the dictatorial nor the unanimity procedure could meet the
knowledge challenge. Since the positive competence is lower than 0.5 %, the
Condorcet Theorem excludes the majority procedure. For the same reason,
a dictatorial procedure would have a very low positive competence, since this
competence would be equal to the competence of an isolated generation. The
dictatorial procedure would still produce better results than the majority
procedure.
The first rule of the procedure is to derive a positive judgment of the
group if this judgment is unanimous between the formulation of the inter-
generational question and the moment of the procedure.
If there is no such unanimity, the second rule comprises two steps. The
first step of the procedure consists in listing the possible known answers to
the transgenerational question. The group holds a negative judgment on
a proposition if since this proposition has been rejected, this judgment has
not been reversed.
The second step of the procedure consists in considering all the negative
judgments selected in the first step as the premise of an eliminative reasoning
which has two premises: the first one is the conjunction of all possible and
known hypotheses; the second one is the conjunction of the premises that
are rejected. The proposition or propositions that have not been rejected
are equated with the collective judgment of the scientific intergenerational
community at the moment of the procedure.
3.4 Evaluation of the epistemic results of this procedure
What is the probability that the proposition on which there is an unanimous
positive judgment is correct? Let us start with some hypotheses. There is
a higher probability that individuals that are biased toward truth reach an
agreement than if they are biased towards error, provided that there is only
one way of being right and several ways of being wrong. We can therefore
suppose that
P (C|R) > P (C|W ) ∧ P (C|R) > P (C) (1)
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with: P (C), the probability of a consensus; P (C/R) the probability of a
consensus knowing that scientists are right; P (C/W ) the probability of a
consensus knowing that scientists are wrong; P (R), the probability that
a scientist is correct is identical to his positive competence. Using Bayes
theorem, we can submit that:
P (R |C) = P (C|R)(P (R)
P (C)
(2)
Assuming that the more generations are considered, the lower the prob-
ability of a consensus is, we can conclude that the more generations are
involved in an unanimous decision, the more probable it is that these gener-
ations support a correct judgment. The first rule of the procedure is there-
fore progressive, since between two moments, the number of generations
increases so that the probability of knowledge raised.
What is the epistemic outcome of the application of the second rule?
Suppose this time that the negative competence of scientists is high. Suppose
also that the number of possible answers to a transgenerational question is
limited even though it is unknown. According to a simple reasoning, the
more hypotheses we have eliminated, the likelier it is that the remaining
hypothesis is the correct one. Therefore, the more a procedure eliminates
hypotheses, the likelier it is to yield a correct answer. As this number
increases with the number of generations, the progressiveness challenge is
satisfied.
Conclusion
The result of this twofold procedure seems, at first sight, strange. It looks
like a dictatorial procedure since the collective judgment is the same as
the judgment of the last generation. What then is the interest of an inter-
generational aggregation procedure? It shows that, provided that several
generations face the same question and provided that they have the right
to judge independently, the probability that the last generation holds a true
judgment is much higher than the positive reliability of this last generation
by itself.
This result shows that PAIJ could help to answer the problems of the
philosophy of science introduced in the first section. This procedure answers
the existential problems since it does not discard the efforts of a given gen-
eration, but rather takes them into account. It allows us to regard intergen-
erational disagreement as a collaborative organization aiming at producing
an eliminative reasoning. It offers a solution to the question of how to ar-
ticulate continuity and discontinuity within the history of science, in order
to avoid the most radical versions of the incommensurability thesis. And,
last but not least, it enables us to consider the possibility of unconceived
alternatives without being driven to despair.
